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 1 Introduction
Global environmental problems require some form of cooperation, like international envi-
ronmental agreements (IEA), in order to overcome the free-rider problem. However, the
voluntary character of many IEAs neither prevents free-riding from non-signatory countries
at the participation stage nor free-riding from actual signatory countries at the enforcement
stage (e.g. fullling the obligations specied in the agreement). The governments of sig-
natory nations have little incentive to enforce the agreements' regulations on their national
industries hence the sole ratication of an IEA does not guarantee any success (Finus &
Tjtta 2003). Therefore, it is interesting that we still observe countries participating in the
negotiation process and signing an IEA, even if its benets are nonrival and nonexcludable.
Further, why do signatory countries sometimes make an eort to install a mere symbolic
treaty in which they agree to obligations which they expect to meet anyway and then even
exert positive eort to fulll (or sometimes overfulll) these obligations.
Our paper argues, that one possible explanation for this behavior can be found in in-
tergovernmental interaction among the signatory countries. The work by Ostrom (1990)
suggests that interaction among individuals and a credible threat of sanctions can help to
discourage free-riding and enforce sustainable harvesting rules for open access resources, at
least at the community level. On an international level these conditions also exist and are
sometimes even more pronounced. Countries do not act independently of each other and
can nowadays easily observe whether a signatory nation defects from the agreement or not.
In addition, governments have various means to impose sanctions on defectors ranging from
diplomatic isolation to trade embargo and the denial of access to an economic or military
union. Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze whether the existence of intergovern-
mental interaction among the participants and the credible threat of sanctions can help to
enforce the obligations of an IEA on open access resources. In particular, we use cross-section
data on signatory countries' eort to enforce the obligations of the 1995 UN Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries, a voluntary IEA. Our sample contains information from 53 coun-
2tries, accounting for about 96 percent of the global marine catch, who signed the Code of
Conduct. The primary dataset contains evaluation information on each signee's compliance
that was compiled in 2005 by an international panel of experts (Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganap-
athiraju & Short 2009). We analyze the eect of intergovernmental relations on a country's
compliance using a spatial autoregressive model with a spatial autoregressive process in the
dependent variable as well as in disturbances and dierent distance based weighting matri-
ces. The geographical distance between the signatory nations is used as an empirical proxy
for the transaction costs of observing other members compliance as well as the frequency of
intergovernmental contacts. Due to less stringent normality assumptions as well as computa-
tional eciency we apply a generalized spatial two-stage least square approach as suggested
by Kelejian & Prucha (1998). Our results suggest that intergovernmental interaction has
a signicant impact on a country's level of compliance. Other countries' compliance act
as strategic complements and the eect decreases in distance. We also nd that a coun-
try's quality of governance and its' attitude to sustainable management to have a signicant
positive eect on compliance score. Decomposing the impact into a direct spatial spillover
and an indirect feedback eect suggests that the total eect of a change in an explanatory
variable is mainly driven by a direct spatial spillover eect. Furthermore, we nd that the
spatial spillover eect, i.e. the in
uence on the the other countries' decision on the level of
compliance, is stronger for specic country groups, (e.g. richer countries). This supports the
idea of a 'pull' eect on compliance at international level as already proposed by Fredriksson
& Millimet (2002) on inter-state level in the U.S.
Our paper extends the ndings in the existing empirical literature in three ways: First,
to our knowledge, this is the rst empirical study to examine compliance behavior under
an IEA on open access resources. The existing empirical literature (e.g. Murdoch, San-
dler & Vijverberg 2003) that analyses the spatial properties of compliance behavior uses
data from (international) environmental agreements on the management of global or local
public goods/bads (e.g. emissions). One strand in the literature applies spatial economet-
3ric techniques to overcome the problem of migrating emissions on measuring an individual
country's reduction eort. Murdoch et al. (2003) point out that the econometric analyses
of reduction eort of transboundary pollution is complicated by the fact that individual
country's eort is hard to measure as one country's total depositions of a pollutant are the
sum of its' own emissions and that of other countries. The application of spatial econo-
metric models and the knowledge of the pollutants' geographic migration patterns helps to
reveal each country's emission reduction eort. However, the spatial model cannot be used
to isolate the eect on intergovernmental relations on compliance eort. In our case, we
directly observe each country's compliance eort and we do not face the problem of trans-
boundary spillovers. We should therefore be able to interpret the coecient of the spatial lag
as the eect of intergovernmental relations. A second strand of spatial econometric studies
measures emission reduction eort by comparing dierences in the stringency of state (e.g.
Fredriksson & Millimet 2002) or national government's environmental regulations (e.g. Eliste
& Fredriksson 2004). These papers compare environmental regulations that are not based
on an agreement which all states or countries signed and where they actually agreed on some
form of cooperative behavior. The absence of such a legal document makes it impossible to
dene defecting behavior at all and therefore leaves no ground for sanctions.
Second, previous studies solely concentrate on controlling for a spatial autoregressive
process while estimating the parameters in their econometric model. The amount of inter-
action between governments and the ability and credibility to impose sanctions, however, is
not homogeneous among countries. Our analysis applies an approach proposed by LeSage &
Pace (2009) and decomposes the impact of spatial spillovers into a direct, indirect and total
eect. This allows us to dierentiate between a spatial spillover and a feedback eect.
Third, both Fredriksson & Millimet (2002) (U.S. states) and Murdoch et al. (2003) (Euro-
pean countries) analyzed decisions regarding environmental agreements of a group of signees
that are rather homogeneous in their level of development as well as their ability to enforce
the obligations of an environmental agreement. In addition, the participants are located in
4a relatively conned geographical area, where the criteria of strategic interaction and low
transaction costs for observing other participants behavior are more easily fullled. We use
an IEA that has been signed by countries around the globe providing large variance in levels
of development, quality of governance and preference for biodiversity. This gives us the pos-
sibility to determine the spatial impact of a change in the level of eort of specic country
groups.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information on
1995 UN Code of Conduct and discusses the theoretical background. Section 3 presents the
data and section 4 explains our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results and section
6 concludes.
2 Background and previous literature
During the last decades we have witnessed a tremendous increase in the ratication of in-
ternational environmental agreements (IEA) on a variety of issues such as ozone depletion,
climate change, pollution of oceans and rivers and over-exploitation of numerous species
of land- and marine mammals, birds and sh. This development has also triggered the
emergence of a vast body of economic literature on this subject1. In general these studies
deal with two research question. First, are international environmental agreements eective
in the provision of the public good compared to the counterfactual outcome. Murdoch &
Sandler (1997) evaluated the eects of the 1997 Montreal Protocol on CFC emissions and
Murdoch, Sandler & Sargent (1997) compared the eects of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol on
Sulphur Emissions and the 1988 Sophia Protocol on NOx emissions. They conclude that
the emission ceilings in the protocols are more in line with non-cooperative Nash behavior
rather than cooperative behavior. Finus & Tjtta (2003) comes to a similar conclusion when
analyzing the outcome of the 1994 Oslo protocol on sulphur emissions. This strand of liter-
ature mainly suggests that most of the IEAs are powerless and their raison d'etre does not
1For an excellent survey see for instance Wagner (2001) and Finus (2008)
5go beyond a symbolic gesture. Bratberg, Tjtta & Oines (2005) use a panel of 23 European
countries to analyze the eect of the 1988 Soa Protocol on the participant's NOx emissions.
Applying a dierence-in-dierence estimator where they consider the non-signatory countries
as a control group they estimate a reduction of 2.1% among the signatory countries. They
conclude that IEAs can have a positive eect on national environmental policy decisions.
The second strand of research in IEAs deals with the question why countries even par-
ticipate in international environmental agreements, if they could have the same benet by
free-riding on the behavior of the other countries. Finus & Tjtta (2003) suggest that
governments with re-election concerns try to maximize votes from two groups: First, en-
vironmentally concerned voters, who do not have full information about the eect of the
IEA, and second, the industry aected by the IEA, which has private information about
abatement costs and can in
uence the political process in a more organized way (e.g. lobby
groups). Politicians can gain political support from the former group by simply signing a
symbolic IEA and still capture votes from the latter group by agreeing on relatively low
obligations. Fredriksson, Neumayer & Ujhelyi (2007) show that governments are more likely
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, if they have strong environmental lobby groups in their coun-
try. This argument, however, would not necessarily explain the participation of developing
countries in some IEAs, because the fraction of 'green votes' among the electorate is rather
low in developing countries and the increase in re-election probability by capturing support
from these voters is very small. An alternative argument for cooperation in IEAs is that
countries are driven by equity considerations (Lange & Vogt 2003, Lange, Loschel, Vogt
& Ziegler 2010). This strand of literature argues that negotiating politicians are not only
driven by the absolute payo from a proposal for their own country but also by the relative
payo compared to the other participating countries. Preference for equity seems to describe
well countries behavior at the negotiation and participation level, but do not automatically
describe the variance in enforcing the actual obligations. A further explanation is based on
the potential eect of repeated intergovernmental relations and resulting bi- or multilateral
6sanctions if a country defects from the agreement. This argument basically builds on the
ideas of Ostrom (1990). Burton (2003) incorporated these ideas in a theoretical model on
community enforcement of voluntary eort restrictions on sheries, while Bratberg et al.
(2005) suggest that the enforcement of a treaty's obligations via strategic interaction of the
signees could also be a valid explanation for IEAs' existence. Fredriksson & Millimet (2002)
account for interaction between governments on environmental policymaking at U.S. state
level by including the abatement levels of neighboring states as explanatory variables. Their
results imply that U.S. states with already more stringent environmental policies have a
positive "pull" eect on their neighbor's decision on abatement levels. Murdoch et al. (2003)
provide a spatial probit analysis of 25 European countries to sign the Helsinki protocol as
well as their decision on the level of enforcement. They use the amount of spillins and tar-
geted spillins of all other signatory countries to identify a countries strategic response. They
nd that spillins increase cooperation at the participation stage but induce free-riding at the
enforcement stage.
2.1 Intergovernmental relationship and compliance behavior
While the standard economic literature on IEAs (Barrett 1994) takes the negotiating govern-
ment as exogenously given, we assume that politicians who are responsible for negotiating
and enforcing an IEA are driven by re-election concerns. Persson & Tabellini (1992) were
among the rst who analyzed the eects of strategic voting on the outcome of multilateral
agreements in a theoretical framework. Buchholz, Haupt & Peters (2005) extended this
analysis to IEAs2. The government will increase its' re-election probability if the electoral
benets of compliance exceed its domestic and international costs. Let us rst have a closer
look at the potential benets from signing and enforcing an IEA on sustainable shery. In
the case of IEAs on sheries it is reasonable to assume that the re-election probability mainly
2Eckert (2003) examined the eect of constitutional rules on participation and enforcement of an IEA in
a two-country model where each country consists of two federal sub-regions. Depending on the delegation
of powers between the federal and the regional governments each country can have a strategic advantage in
the negotiation game.
7depends on two groups of voters in society, general citizens and the shery industry. The
general citizens have some 'green' preferences for sustainable management of international
sh stocks. One might think of this as the value attached to the sole existence of a certain
sh species, either the one that is directly subject to the IEA (e.g. tuna) or indirectly in the
case of larger predators (e.g. dolphins). However, obtaining information about the optimal
set of rules to ensure a sustainable level of harvest is costly for each citizen and therefore
the average citizen is badly informed. The politician can capture support from these 'un-
informed green voters' twice: First by simply signing a mere symbolic IEA which is very
visible. Second, if the industry complies or even over-complies, the voters might attribute
this success to the (unobservable) enforcement eort of the politician.
Regarding the domestic costs of signing and enforcing the IEA, a rst subset of costs com-
prises of loss in voter's utility through the IEA. The support for IEAs on certain pollutants
(e.g. CO2) is in general rather low because the IEA's obligations infer costs on the average
citizen as well. The situation is dierent for IEAs on biodiversity or sheries, which mainly
aect a narrow industry. In most of today's economies the shery industry has become an
increasingly unimportant sector when it comes to employment3 and contribution to GDP4.
However, this does not necessarily suggest that the government does not pay attention to
the demands from this group. The government might even pay relatively more attention to
the preferences expressed via the industry's lobbying groups (Persson 1998) as compared to
the general electorate. The shery industry has private information about its compliance
costs (Finus & Tjtta 2003) and the government can therefore capture votes from both the
green voters and the shery industry by signing an international environmental agreement
with loose obligations. The government simply negotiates for low compliance goals at the
signatory level and/or keeps the level of enforcement low. Another factor in
uencing the
costs of compliance for the domestic industries is driven by the heterogeneity of shing ca-
3According to FAO (1999) the average percentage of shers among the economically active population in
agriculture in high-sea shing countries was around 4.8% in 1990.
4The average percentage of shery exports per GDP among high-sea shing countries was around 0.8%
in 1995 (FAO 1999).
8pacity between industries in dierent countries. Dayton-Johnson & Bardhan (2002) and
Burton (2003) provide community-level models of shery that allow for heterogeneity in
shing capacity among the dierent players.
A second subset of costs is related to the enforcement of the IEA. In many countries the
shery industry is dispersed over a number of locations and the central government dele-
gates the control task related to the IEA to bureaucratic agencies or regional governments.
Installing and maintaining a bureaucratic apparatus that controls the compliance requires
public funds that could be used to provide public goods elsewhere. These direct costs of
enforcement depend on the country's level of institutional quality.
Our main interest is on the impact of international costs related to the IEA. These costs
emerge basically from not signing or not complying to the IEA. They could be dened
directly in the agreement or could be a result from resulting sanctions in strategic inter-
actions among the signatory governments. At community level (e.g. a small sher town),
strategic interaction among participants of an agreement make the threat of sanctions more
credible, thus increasing each participant's reduction eort and decreasing the incentive to
free-ride(e.g. Ostrom 1990, Burton 2003). Ostrom (1990) outlined a set of 5 broad charac-
teristics that need to be met in order to have a stable agreement: 1) Members support the
rules of the agreement and eective monitoring. 2) Outsiders can be excluded. 3) Members
or communities have repeated communication and dense social networks. 4) The harvesting
(and compliance) eort of the other members is observable. 5) Moderate rates of change in
the stock of resources and the level of harvesting technology. So far, the literature (e.g. Dietz,
Ostrom & Stern 2003) suggests that there are only a few settings in the world that fulll
all 5 conditions. Most of these cases can be found in situations where a common property
resource is shared by a community in narrowly dened geographic area.
Common property resources where sustainable management requires some form of in-
ternational cooperation between a number of countries have so far been considered not to
fulll the necessary conditions for an Ostrom-type governance of the commons. Maybe this
9argument does not hold for all IEAs. Let us rst have a look at how the institutional frame-
work created by the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries actually performs
vis-a-vis these 5 conditions. We basically go through the conditions one by one and examine
how these characteristics apply to the Code of Conduct : 1) The participating nations agreed
to the set of rules by signing the agreement. Although the Code of Conduct is voluntary,
there is some legal document were signees clearly indicated their approval. If one member
country defects from the agreement there is at least the possibility for other members to refer
to the legal document. 2) The Code of Conduct was signed by 53 countries that account for
96 % of the global marine catch. Although it is not possible to exclude the shing nations
responsible for the remaining 4 % of the global catch, we are condent that new entrants
play a negligible role. 3) Although the shing industries from dierent nations do not engage
in frequent face-to-face communication, the ocial representatives of the signatory countries
do. They meet permanently in international boards (e.g. UN general assembly meetings,
WTO meetings) and engage in a wide number of negotiations (e.g. EU and NATO en-
largement). Hence, there is strategic interaction among the participant countries at least at
the diplomatic level. In addition, there are bi- and multilateral tools that make the threat
of sanctions, in case a member country defects, very plausible. For example, EU-member
countries use the veto-threat to block participation aspirations of some of its neighbouring
countries such as Turkey and Croatia. 4) It is assumed that signatory nations do neither
have information about the others compliance eort and it could be hard to identify players
that defect. However, this is not the case in high-seas shing. Nowadays, shing nations
actually have very good information about other countries shing practices and harvesting
eort, both legal and illegal. 5) It is probably not reasonable to assume a moderate change
of technology over this 10-year period.
Although this was just a back-of-the-envelope comparison, its purpose was to illustrate
that there is some ground for supporting the idea that on international level, strategic interac-
tion among governments could have an eect on country's compliance behavior in the context
10of an IEA. Among Ostrom's characteristics the extent of knowledge about other members'
behavior (characteristic 4) and the frequency of interaction among countries (characteristic
3) dene the probability that defection and under-compliance will be revealed as well as
the likelihood of becoming subject of bi- or multilateral sanctions. The key assumption of
this paper is that these characteristics, and therefore the likelihood of a sanction, are in-
versely related with the distance between two countries. It is easier for Australia to observe
shing behaviour of Japanese vessels in a high-sea shing zone in the Indian Ocean than
it is to observe Nigerian vessels in a high-sea shing zone in the Atlantic. The amount of
interactions between ocial representatives of two countries also decreases in distance. Al-
though most countries have representatives in multinational boards and organizations there
are other multinational institutions that are composed of only countries within a specic re-
gion of the world (e.g. EU, MERCOSUR, ASEA, African Union). Based on this discussion
we argue that, all else equal, the compliance behavior of one country is positively related to
the compliance behaviour of other countries and this eect is decreasing in distance.
2.2 The 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries had its origin in the 19th session of the FAO's
Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in 1991. Related to the discussion on pelagic driftnet shing,
the COFI pointed out the importance of the FAO to promote more sustainable shing gear
and techniques. This idea was further developed and formalized at the 1992 International
Conference on Responsible Fishing in Cancun. The participating nations signed a decla-
ration that called upon the FAO to draft a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. In
October 1995, the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was adopted unanimously by
the members of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The general
objective of the Code of Conduct is to promote sustainable development and harvesting of
world sheries through responsible management (Hosch, Ferraro & Failler 2011). The code
consists of 12 articles, where the rst 6 articles mainly describe the legal framework of the
11Code and articles 7 to 12 are of more technical nature and dene the Code's objectives.
Most importantly, the Code of Conduct is non-binding and the principles and standards
provided in the legal text are only of voluntary nature. In 2005 after 10 years of Code
of Conduct 53 countries, accounting for 96 percent of the global marine catch, have been
evaluated according to their compliance with the code's suggestions for sustainable sheries
(Pitcher et al. 2009). The results have been quiet disillusioning. Not one of those countries
evaluated reach an overall compliance score of more than 60 percent. The authors suggest
that the lack of compliance is mainly due to the voluntary character of this international
environmental agreement.
A second assessment by Hosch et al. (2011) using 9 case studies comes to a similar
conclusion: Although a lot of signatory countries have implemented laws that re
ect the
objective of the Code of Conduct, actual change in shing practices is hardly observed.
They suggest that a lack of political will and administrative inertia are among the reasons,
why the positive in
uence of the Code on domestic laws is not translated into real action.
3 Data
We compiled our dataset from a number of sources. Our main variable of interest, compliance
with the Code of Conduct, is taken from the study of Pitcher et al. (2009). They evaluated the
performance of all 53 signatory countries5 using a set of 44 dierent score variables. Each
score variable ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating better compliance. The
denition of the score variables is directly drawn from the clauses of the Code. Pitcher et al.
(2009) used a great number of separate sources including: national legislation, international
treaties (www.searoundus.org), country synopses from FAO, reports to FAO and NGOs, web-
pages of national sheries agencies, NGO websites as well as information of published work
and sheries experts to derive the compliance score for each country. To ensure consistency,
5Given that these 53 countries account for 96 percent of the global marine catch, we are condent that
sample selection bias plays a negligible role.
12a formal scoring protocol was employed.
The 44 score variables can be divided into 6 dierent subgroups. These 6 subgroups can
then be broadly categorized into behavioral and intentional indicators. The former set of
performance indicators summarizes measures, which requires real action. It contains mainly
indicators that are quantiable and have an immediate eect on shing stocks. The rst
subgroup in this category summarizes a nation's compliance with respect to regulations
on stocks, 
eets and gear, Regulations. This subgroup examines for example whether by-
catch of non-target species is minimized or excess 
eet capacity has been actually reduced.
It also investigates whether shing methods are harmful and whether the country invests
some real eort to rebuilt depleted stocks. The second behavioral subgroup evaluates the
country's monitoring, control and surveillance system, MCS. It inspects the eectiveness
to monitor implemented rules and estimates the extend of illegal shing in the country's
shing area. The last subgroup is the least tangible criteria in the behavioral category and
deals with social and economic questions, Socio   Econ. It evaluates how the government
manages con
icts among dierent shing sectors, how the needs of indigenous people and
local shing communities are met.
In contrast, intentional measures contain a number of performance indicators that could
be considered less tangible and implementation and maintenance of some of these indicators
does not necessarily require large eort and funds from the government. These subgroups
have a more symbolic character and evaluate a country's good intentions. Management ob-
jective, Objectives, contains a set of scores for the country's plans to meet the requirements
of the Code of Conduct. Does the management plan aim to restore depleted stocks or does
it consider human impacts (e.g. pollution) on the shery habitat? The second intentional
subgroup evaluates the procedures how the plan is actually implemented, Framework. For
example, does the management plan contain long-term objectives? It veries whether the
country applies timely and appropriate statistics to gather information about the progress in
implementing the goals set out in the management plan. The nal set of questions accounts
13for precautionary intentions, Precautionary. It basically collects information about contin-
gency plans, the role of uncertainty about sh stocks in setting the management objectives
and the design of the internal review process.
Although both set of indicators are important to evaluate a country's compliance to the
code of conduct, we expect a stronger strategic intergovernmental interaction in the indica-
tors that measure actual behavior. For example, a shing country that has updated its 
eet
to meet the criteria of minimizing by-catch wants its competitors in the same shing area
also to apply to this criterion. Vessels from the complying nation observe the equipment of
other shing nation's vessels. If these other vessels use less-sustainable (but more eective)
shing methods, the shermen from the complying nation are disadvantaged. Hence, fulll-
ing this requirement of the code of conduct is costly and has a direct eect on the shermen's
competitiveness. The complying country's government can collect reports about the other
country's under-compliance and initiate sanctions. In comparison, the complying nation is
less interested whether the other shing nation has developed plans and compiled a set of
management objectives to meet the requirements of the code of conduct. An additional ar-
gument for the preference for the behavioral measures is that compliance to the intentional
measures does not necessarily result in real action (Hosch et al. 2011).
We use similar empirical proxies as McWhinnie (2009) for technological capability, har-
vesting costs and government's ability to enforce compliance. As data on shery specic
technology is not available, we use the country's gross domestic product, GDP, to measure
a country's technical capability. Data on GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity) stems
from the Word Development Indicators (WDI 2007) and is varying between $ 776 and $
32145 with a mean of $ 11899 . To capture harvesting costs we use the average distance
from a country to the FAO zones it is operating, COST. We use a GIS-shapele with coor-
dinates of ports in each country and identied the closest port to each FAO area. We then
calculated the great circle distance from this port to the center of a FAO zone and repeated
this step for each FAO zone the country is shing in. These distances were weighted by the
14sh capture of the country in the respective FAO zone. In our sample Bangladesh, Senegal
and Japan are on average high distance shing countries, whereas the Philippines, Ireland
and Peru are shing the main part of their capture in waters close to their home port. As
a measure of the government's ability to enforce compliance, we use a standard measure for
quality of governance based on PRS group data, GOV . This is a composite indicator that
combines, among others, information about governmental stability, bureaucratic quality and
corruption. We further add a dummy variable EU that accounts for countries, who are
subject to the EU's common shery policy. Furthermore, the country's cost of compliance is
in
uenced by the degree of competition in the FAO area, COMPET. To capture this char-
acteristic we use data on shing behavior from the FAO shery statistics. First we construct
n  m matrices for the 17 FAO major shing areas, where each country pair get 1 if they
are competitors in the same shing area. Then we sum up the competitors in the shing
area and take the average over all shing areas of the country's number on competitors.
This allows us to measure the average strength of competition a country faces in the shing
areas. Ecuador, Peru and Mexico are the countries with the lowest degree of competition
with 6 competitors on average. The Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden face an average of 16
competitors in a shing zone, which makes them to the countries with the highest degree of
competition. Our measure on environmental performance, BIO, stems from the Yale Envi-
ronmental Performance Index (Emerson, Esty, Levy, Kim, Mara, de Sherbinin, Srebotnjak
& Jaiteh 2010), which provides a composite index from six subareas. We have chosen one
of the subareas - biodiversity - for our measure of environmental performance of a country
for the following reasons. First, there are concerns of high collinearity of the overall environ-
mental performance index with the GDP of a country. This stems from the fact that 50 %
of the index is based on environmental health variables, like water sanitation. Second, the
biodiversity index is based on following variables: the national extend of protected areas, a
measure of the degree to which the country's wildest areas are protected, the timber harvest
rate and the oversubscription of water resources. In our opinion this subgroup captures
15the countries attitude to sustainable management and use of natural resources best. In our
sample Yemen is the country with the lowest score of 13.7 and New Zealand has the highest
score with 73.5 points. To measure the size of the shing industry in relation to the country
size, we use data on the export value of sh from the FAO Fisheries Statistics divided by
GDP per capita of that country, EXPORT. The size of the shing industry allows us to
capture two country characteristics. First, it is a measure for the openness of a country to
the world market. Second, it captures the potential of the industry to lobby against costly
adaptations to more sustainable shing measures. Bigger industries will easier get attention
by the government and politicians will avoid implementing policies, which could aect many
voters negatively in the short run. According to our sample Egypt has the smallest share
of shing exports on GDP per capita with 0.0017% and New Zealand is the country with
the highest share of shing exports on GDP per capita with around 18%. Table 1 reports
descriptive statistics of the variables we use in our regressions.
4 Empirical Implementation
To determine the in
uence of intergovernmental relationship on the country's level of eort,
as discussed in section 2.2, we base our empirical strategy on a spillover model of strategic
interaction (Brueckner 2003). In this framework a country decides on the level of compliance
ci, but the country is simultaneously aected by the level of compliance chosen elsewhere,
which indicates the spillover eect.6 This leads to the following objective function for country
i:
V (ci;c i;Xi) (1)
6 Following Autant-Bernard & LeSage (2010) in static cross-sectional models of spatial interaction, where
observations re
ect a steady state equilibrium outcome, the countries' simultaneous decision on the level of
compliance can be interpreted as representing a sequence that would occur over time during movement to
the next steady state equilibrium.
16where c i is a vector of the chosen level of compliance c by the other countries and Xi is
a vector of intracountry characteristics of country i, which determine preferences for the i's
level of c. Country i chooses the level of ci to maximize equation (1). Due to the fact that
this depends on both, c i and Xi, the solution can be written as :
ci = R(c i;Xi) (2)
where function R represents a reaction function, which indicates country's i response to the
compliance behavior of the other countries. The position of the reaction function depends
on the intracountry characteristics X of country i. Following our previous discussion on
intergovernmental relationship we expect the sign of the reaction function's slope to be posi-
tive, which indicates that the decisions on the level of compliance is a strategic complement.
For our empirical analysis of the eect of intergovernmental relations on compliance we can
write the econometric function with the following general form
ci = Wncj + Xi + i (3)
where ci is a i1 vector of the dependent variable, Xi is the nk matrix of control variables,
 is the corresponding k  1 vector of regression parameters and i is an error term. Wn is
a n  n spatial weighting matrix, with elements !ij, which represents nonnegative weights
that typically capture the pattern of interaction between country i and country j. The scalar
autoregressive parameter  re
ects the strength of interaction between country i and country
j. Given our assumption that each country's level of eort is public knowledge to the other
countries and that the decision of the own and the other countries decision are determined
simultaneously, equation (3) cannot be consistently estimated using OLS since the spatial
lag
PJ
j=1 !ijcj is endogenous and correlated with the error term i (Ord 1975, Anselin 1988).
Estimation is further complicated due to another form of interdependence that arises in
spillover models of strategic interaction. It is a often assumed that i includes omitted
17variables that are spatially dependent. In this case governments will share some unobserved,
regional characteristics, that are correlated with the eort to comply with code's suggestions.
Spatial correlation in the error term can make OLS estimates inecient (Anselin 1988).
i = Mni + vi (4)
where Mn is a n  n spatial weighting matrix, which is assumed to be the same as Wn in
equation (3).  is again a scalar autoregressive parameter, which re
ects the strength of
interaction between country i and country j and vi is a well-behaved n  1 vector of error
terms. To deal with the problem of a spatial autoregressive process in the dependent as
well as in the error term we apply an instrumental variable (IV) type approach for cross-
sectional models as suggested by Kelejian & Robinson (1993) and Kelejian & Prucha (1998),
proceeding in three steps.7 In the rst step equation (3) is estimated using a two-stage least
squares estimator (2SLS), where the matrix of exogenous instruments H is a subset of linear
combinations of, X, the other countries' characteristics and, Wn, a weight matrix. In this








Using Z = (Wnci;X) we can dene the consistent, but not ecient, 2SLS estimator for 
and  as








where PH = H (H0H)
 1 H0. Although the rst step deals with the simultaneity problem of
the compliance decision, one still needs to account for the spatial autocorrelation in the error
7An alternative approach to estimate these models requires the use of maximum likelihood (ML) esti-
mators. But recent literature has shown that the IV estimator approach is computationally simpler, has
similar performance in small samples to ML and has no distributional assumption (Kelejian, Prucha &
Yuzefovich 2004).
18term. Therefore, in the second step, we derive the residuals from the rst step to estimate
 and the variance 2
v of the i.i.d. error term in equation (4) by general moments' method
as proposed in Kelejian & Prucha (1999). This estimation method leads to a consistent
estimation of ~ . In the last step we apply a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to the model
to account for spatial correlation and reestimate equation (6) by a 2SLS procedure. By

















  ~ WnZ, which leads nally to the consistent and asymptotical normal generalized
spatial two-stage least squares estimator (GS2SLS) for  and 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!ijCOMPLj + 1GDPi + 2COSTi + 3GOVi
4EUi + 5COMPETi + 6BIOi + 7EXPORTi + i
(8)
COMPLi is the compliance score of country i, !ij is a spatial weight assigned to country j
by country i, COMPLj is the compliance behavior of country j and  is the corresponding
parameter of interest. Strategic interaction between governments requires  to be statisti-
cally signicant, where a nonzero coecient implies that the country's level of compliance
is a function of the eort made by other countries'. According to our hypothesis, we expect
 to have a positive sign. The null hypothesis is that there is no strategic interaction eect
between the governments, which suggests that the decision on the level of compliance is
made independently. A country's decision on the level of eort is, of course, not only the
outcome of strategic interaction between governments. Rather, in absence of interaction ef-
fects, each government is in
uenced by a set of intracountry factors, which form the basis for
19choices of the level of compliance eort. We expect the country's with higher technological
capabilities to achieve better compliance score. Mean distance to the shing areas, COST,
and mean competition among the FAO zones, COMP, are expected to be negatively corre-
lated with compliance behavior. GOV should depict a positive sing. A country's eort to
preserve biodiversity, BIO, is used to capture the attitude of a country's citizens towards
environmental issues. The coecient is expected to have a positive sign. In contrast, we
expect that a strong shing industry, EXPORT, has a negative in
uence on the compliance
score. Following Gray & Hatchard (2003) and Daw & Gray (2005) the EU common shery
policy (CFP) can be seen as a political success but an environmental failure. Due to the
strict top-down structure of the CFP and a choice of shery management tools giving the
wrong incentives the CFP leads to an alarming state of many sh stocks within the European
waters. Therefore we expect the sign of EU to be negative.
To capture the spatial relationship, a variety of spatial weight matrices are constructed.
The distance information was generated by using longitude and latitude information (taken
from the CEPII database) of each country's most populated cities. First, weight matri-
ces of spatial interdependence are calculated using the inverse distances between the most
populated city of each country pair in our sample, Distance. The distances are calculated
according to the great circle formula. Choosing the most populated cities and not the capi-
tals of a country for our distance calculation allows us to capture the distance between the
economic centers of the countries. Second, we use the squared inverse distance between the
most populated cities of each country pair to determine the o diagonal elements of the
matrices ,Distance2. Using the squared inverse distance simply assigns closer countries a
stronger weight than more remote ones. For the third weight matrix, Near2, we apply a
nearest neighbor concept, where countries are dened to be neighbors if the distance between
their most populated cities is less than 3150 kilometers, which is the minimum distance from
the most remote country in our sample to his nearest neighbor. This cut-o point has been
taken in order to avoid a so called 'island states' eect in weight matrices(Anselin 1988).
20In our sample countries have on average 8 neighbors, where Senegal has with 19 neighbors
the highest amount of neighbors whereas Canada, Australia, Netherlands, Philippines and
Egypt have just one neighbor. The o diagonal elements of the weight matrices have been
determined in the following way. If countries are outside those distance bands, they are
assigned a value of 0 else the o diagonal elements of the matrices are dened by the squared
inverse distance. We have chosen to use the squared distance, because it allows us to give
nearer countries a stronger weight.All matrices are row standardized.
5 Results
5.1 Regression Results
We rst estimated equation (8) for each of the three behavioral compliance indicators,
regulations, MCS and Socio-Econ. Table 2 presents the spatial estimates for the determinants
of the compliance behavioral indicators using squared inverse distance weighting matrix,
which gives closer countries more weight than the inverse distance weighting matrix 8. The
sign of the spatial lag  is positive and signicant at the 1%-level in 2 out of 3 cases. This
suggests that a country's compliance behavior is positively in
uenced by the compliance of
other signatory countries. Our empirical proxies for harvesting technology (ln(GDP)) and
costs (COST) do not appear to have a signicant impact on enforcement behavior. These
results are in line with McWhinnie (2009). Countries with a higher quality of institutions
have signicantly better compliance scores. As expecteded, members of the European Union
(EU) sharing the EU CFP have on average a lower compliance score. This is in line with
a broad scientic literature (e.g. Gray & Hatchard 2003, Daw & Gray 2005), that the CFP
does not support or give the right incentives for a sustainable use of the sh resource in
the common waters. The remaining indicators for cost of compliance, average competition
8 For robustness checks we have dened spatial dependency using the other weighting matrices described
above, but our estimates do not change signicantly.
21in the FAO area (COMPET), a country's eort to protect biodiversity (BIO) and the
importance of the shing industry (EXPORT) do not depict a signicant coecient. The
choice of instruments passes the Hansen-J test for over-identication and the second stage
estimates yield a suciently large R2 between 0.5 and 0.8 depending on the compliance
indicator. In contrast to the previous compliance indicators, we do not nd a signicant
spatial relationship among country's compliance behavior captured by our weakest behavioral
indicator, Socio   Econ. Compliance to Socio-economic objectives seems to be only driven
by the quality of governance and is inversely related with the eort to protect biodiversity.
In addition to the enforcement of behavioral objectives, we repeated our exercise for the
intentional indicators as well. Table 3 presents a summary of this analysis by presenting the
estimates for the three intentional indicators, objectives;framework and precaution using
the squared inverse distance weight matrix. Strategic interaction plays a signicant role on
enforcement eort regarding precaution (at the 5%-level) but not in the case of framework
and objectives. Once again, quality of governance is the main driver of compliance behavior.
In contrast to the behavioral compliance scores, eort to protect biodiversity is signicantly
positively correlated with compliance in all three areas.
5.2 Determining the impact of spatial spillovers
The dependence structure in a spatial regression model allows us to retrieve more detailed
information about the interaction eects (LeSage & Pace 2009). Consider for example the
eect of institutional quality, GOV . An improvement in this variable in country i will have
a direct eect on the compliance of country i as well as an indirect eect on the compliance
of all other countries due to the spatial dependence 9. Following LeSage & Pace (2009) the
magnitude of the spatial spillover will depend upon the position of the countries in space, the
degree of connectivity among them, which is determined by the spatial weight matrix W, the
9Due to this interdependencies the derivative of yi with respect to xjk will be potentially non-zero and is
determined by the spatial multiplier n 10(I   W) 1 and the direct impact k, where n is the number of
observations and  is a n1 vector of ones. The spatial multiplier captures the magnitude and distribution
of the spatial spillovers in the system. For a more detailed discussion see (e.g. Anselin 2003).
22parameter , which represents the strength of spatial dependence in our variable of interest
and the parameter . The total eect of a change in the explanatory variable consists of three
components: the direct eect, due to the change in the explanatory variable; the indirect
spatial spillover eects, which indicates the impact from the change in country i to the
other countries; and a direct spatial spillover eect, which can be interpreted as a feedback
loop. This feedback loop captures the eect that arises from a change of the explanatory
variable in country i on the dependent variable in country j and the change in country j also
aects the dependent variable in country i. Since the impact of changes in the explanatory
variables diers over all observations, LeSage & Pace (2009) suggest using scalar summary
measures of these impacts. Table 4 presents the scalar summary measures for a simultaneous
marginal increase in the kth explanatory variable accounting for spatial spillover eects and
divided into direct, indirect and total eects. In comparison to our previous estimates, as
presented in Table 2 and Table 3, we see a signicant increase in the impact of changes
of the explanatory variables on a country's compliance eort. Depending on the dierent
compliance indicators the magnitude of the increase in impact diers between 1.620 k and
6.113 k, which represents the size of the spatial multiplier. This suggests that ignoring
the spatial spillover eects while estimating the factors determining the level of compliance
will lead to biased estimates that underestimate the impact of the variables by a factor of 1.6
to 6.1, respectively. Focusing on the components of the total eect gives us an interesting
insight on the importance of the spatial spillovers in our model of strategic interaction. For
the compliance indicators that require real action, regulations and monitoring, we observe
that the magnitude of the impact is mainly driven by spatial spillover eects cumulated over
all regions in the sample. Compared to the direct eects the behavior of the other countries
in
uences the decision on the level of compliance by country i in the extent of 60% to 79%
respectively. Whereas in the case of the intentional indicator precautions the decision on the
level of eort is just aected by the behavior of the countries in the extend of 36%. These
results support our argument that the complying country is less interested whether other
23shing nations have developed plans and compiled a set of management objectives to meet
the requirements of the code of conduct than in measures that require real actions.
Since Table 4 represents cumulative parameter estimates for a simultaneous marginal
increase in the kth explanatory variable, we are not able to examine the dissemination of the
impact of a change in compliance eort of a particular country or group of countries in space.
Therefore, following Egger, Larch, Pfaermayr & Walde (2008), we exogenously change a




= 1 and holding all
other variables constant. This allows us to focus on the spatial spillover eect of a change in
compliance eort, where the magnitude of the eect depends on the position of the country in
space, the degree of connectivity among the countries and the strength of spatial dependence.
Following our discussion on the intergovernmental relationship and compliance behavior we
expect that strategic interactions between governments make a threat of sanctions for non-
compliance more credible. Furthermore, we assume that the potential to sanction non-
compliance is not equally distributed among the participating countries, but rather depend
on specic characteristics, like the level of economic development. Therefore, we calculate
the direct, indirect and total eect of a standardized change in an explanatory variable for
country groups that dier in their level of economic development (Table 5). First, let us
look at the case, where the quartile with the highest economic development changes their
compliance behavior, measured by regulations, by one unit. With 3.866 the total eect of
such a change will be far above the average eect and will be mainly driven by the spatial
spillover eect. Now, let us consider the case where the quartile with the lowest economic
endowment changes their compliance behavior by unity. With 2.500 the total eect is below
the average eect and just about 2/3 of the total eect of the highest quartile. By looking
on the distribution of the total eect into the direct and indirect eect we see that the
dierence of the impact of a standardized change on compliance behavior of the highest
compared to the lowest quartile is mainly due to a change in the spatial spillover eect. This
eect can be strongly observed in both behavioral compliance indicators, regulations and
24monitoring. In our intentional compliance indicator, precautions, the impact of the spatial
spillover compared to the total eect as well as the dierence between the highest and lowest
quartile is not that strong, which again supports our argument that countries are more
interested in real action than in good intentions. In a further step, we increase the group
size to analyze the behavior of this eect in more detail. Therefore, we divided the sample
in two equally sized groups, a group with relatively richer and a group with relatively poorer
economies. Focusing on the total eect we are able to observe an interesting eect. Whereas
the total eect of the group of poorer nations is nearly constant, the total eect of the group
of richer nations changes signicantly. This eect stays robust for both, the behavioral and
intentional indicators. Following these results we are further interested, if we are able to nd
an optimal group size, where the total eect of a unitary change in compliance behavior is
the biggest. Table 6 presents our calculations of the cumulative total eect for a standardized
change in a country's explanatory variable. Starting with the country, with the highest level
of economic development and than adding the second richest country and so on, our results
suggests that the optimal group size with the highest total eect, consists of the nine richest
countries. These ndings stay robust over all three indicators measuring compliance eort,
the two behavioral, regulations and monitoring and the intentional indicator, precautions,
whereas the in
uence of the group size is the weakest in our intentional indicator. This
means that the magnitude of the total eect is more equally distributed than compared to
our behavioral indicators.
6 Conclusion
So far, strategic interactions among participants have only been considered to be useful in
enforcing the objectives of an agreement in the context of small communities. This paper
suggests that some international environmental agreements and existing intergovernmental
relations fulll, to a certain extent, the criteria of an Ostrom-type mechanism to manage
25open access resources. Modern technology allows countries to observe other signatory coun-
tries' compliance behavior and repeated intergovernmental relationships make the threat
of sanctions in the case of non-compliance credible. We use cross-section information on
country-level compliance to the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries to iden-
tify the drivers of the participating countries' eort levels. To estimate the eect of strategic
interaction on one country's compliance behavior we use the spatial lag of the other coun-
tries' compliance behavior and apply a generalized spatial two-stage least square approach as
suggested by Kelejian & Prucha (1998). We nd strong support that a country's enforcement
eort of objectives that require real action is positively related to the other signees' level
of compliance. The relationship is rather weak for objectives that are more symbolic. We
also nd evidence that quality of governance, EU membership as well as a country's eort
to protect biodiversity have an impact on compliance behavior. Furthermore, we nd that
the spatial spillover eect, i.e. the in
uence on the the other countries' decision on the level
of compliance, is stronger for specic country groups, e.g. richer countries. This supports
the idea of a pull eect on compliance on the international level.
Our results suggest that intergovernmental relationships have an impact on a country's
eort to enforce the objectives of an IEA on open access resources. However, the low levels
of overall compliance to the agreement indicate that strategic interaction on international
level is not a sucient constraint to ensure the sustainable management of an open access
resource.
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30Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Regulations 49 2:548 1:735 0:143 7:286
MCS 49 4:459 1:717 1:333 9:167
Socio   Econ 49 3:772 1:902 0:333 8:000
Objectives 49 4:392 1:809 1:333 8:222
Framework 49 4:977 2:006 0:857 7:857
Precaution 49 3:771 2:287 0:667 7:667
GDP 49 9341:047 10976:470 241:984 35959:340
COST 49 717:200 1668:991 0:876 8960:758
GOV 49 0:660 0:209 0:311 0:996
EU 49 0:245 0:434 0:000 1:000
COMPET 49 11:407 2:518 6:000 16:000
BIO 49 49:353 15:656 13:700 73:500
EXPORT 49 0:008 0:026 1:77e 5 0:183
31Table 2: Determinants of Compliance on Behavioral Objectives
Weight matrix: Regulations Monitoring Socio   Econ
 0:644 0:836  0:232
(0:164) (0:307) (0:385)
ln(GDP) 0:006  0:059 0:043
(0:035) (0:043) (0:038)
COST 0:005 0:055 0:072
(0:049) (0:084) (0:148)
GOV 5:445 7:484 5:645
(1:643) (2:395) (2:147)
EU  1:260  1:496  0:356
(0:514) (0:556) (0:520)
COMPET  0:005 0:042  0:069
(0:076) (0:076) (0:090)
BIO 0:005  0:001 0:030
(0:008) (0:011) (0:011)
EXPORT 2:809 3:497  3:881
(3:587) (5:413) (4:484)
Hansen J-Statistic 0:262 0:731 0:832
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 0:000 0:006 0:108
1st stage F-Test 0:000 0:004 0:000
R2 0.785 0.600 0.540
Notes: Weight Matrix: Squared Inverse Distance. 49 observations. Ro-
bust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signicance at
the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
32Table 3: Determinants of Compliance on Intentional Objectives
Weight matrix: Precaution Framework Objectives
 0:383 0:125 0:407
(0:158) (0:310) (0:311)
ln(GDP) 0:015 0:011  0:010
(0:022) (0:025) (0:027)
COST 0:032  0:055  0:007
(0:053) (0:047) (0:070)
GOV 7:232 6:638 6:529
(1:348) (1:761) (1:760)
EU 0:207  0:344  0:621
(0:462) (0:479) (0:463)
COMPET  0:050  0:054  0:073
(0:072) (0:081) (0:076)
BIO 0:016 0:038 0:021
(0:007) (0:010) (0:010)
EXPORT  0:971 0:223 1:185
(3:377) (3:183) (3:050)
Hansen J-Statistic 0:265 0:648 0:369
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 0:016 0:259 0:000
1st stage F-Test 0:000 0:000 0:000
R2 0.778 0.692 0.670
Notes: Weight Matrix: Squared Inverse Distance. 49 observations.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.




Direct 0.006 -0.075 0.015
Indirect Spatial 0.009 -0.284 0.009
Total 0.016 -0.359 0.024
COST
Direct 0.005 0.070 0.033
Indirect Spatial 0.008 0.264 0.019
Total 0.014 0.334 0.052
GOV
Direct 6.067 9.560 7.462
Indirect Spatial 9.250 36.189 4.258
Total 15.317 45.749 11.720
EU
Direct -1.404 -1.911 0.213
Indirect Spatial -2.140 -7.233 0.122
Total -3.544 -9.144 0.335
COMPET
Direct 0.005 0.053 -0.051
Indirect Spatial 0.008 0.201 -0.029
Total 0.014 0.255 -0.080
BIO
Direct 0.006 -0.002 0.017
Indirect Spatial 0.009 -0.007 0.010
Total 0.015 0.009 0.026
EXPORT
Direct 3.129 4.467 -1.001
Indirect Spatial 4.771 16.910 -0.571
Total 7.900 21.376 -1.573
Notes: Weight Matrix: Squared Inverse Distance. 49 observations. Spatial
Multiplier: Regulations (2.813); Monitoring (6.113); Precautions (1.620).
34Table 5: Spatial eects of a standardized change in an explanatory
variable
Countrygroup Direct Indirect Total
Regulations
Average 0.114 1.699 2.813
Highest Quartile 0.168 2.698 3.866
Lowest Quartile 0.120 1.380 2.500
1st & 2nd Quartile 0.133 2.023 3.155
3st & 4nd Quartile 0.096 1.388 2.484
Monitoring
Average 0.277 4.835 6.113
Highest Quartile 0.449 9.030 10.479
Lowest Quartile 0.275 3.386 4.662
1st & 2nd Quartile 0.334 6.228 7.562
3st & 4nd Quartile 0.223 3.498 4.721
Precaution
Average 0.032 0.589 1.620
Highest Quartile 0.044 0.830 1.874
Lowest Quartile 0.034 0.512 1.546
1st & 2nd Quartile 0.036 0.667 1.703
3st & 4nd Quartile 0.027 0.514 1.541
Notes: Weight Matrix: Squared Inverse Distance. Rank Vari-
able: GDP per capita (constant 2000). Spatial Multiplier: Reg-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Appendix: Description and Sources of Variables
























Korea. Rep. South Africa
Sri Lanka
37Table 8: Variable description and sources
Variable Description Source
Regulations Measures the degree of compliance on regulation on stocks, Pitcher et al. (2009)

eets and gear
MCS Measures the degree of compliance on eectiveness of Pitcher et al. (2009)
monitoring, control & surveillance. Also measures the
extent of illegal shing
Socio   Econ Measures the government's ability to manage con
ict Pitcher et al. (2009)
among dierent shing sectors and how needs of
minorities are met
Objectives Evaluates the government's plans and strategies to meet Pitcher et al. (2009)
the objective of the Code of Conduct.
Framework Evaluates the government's procedures of implementing Pitcher et al. (2009)
the plans and strategies.
Precaution Measures the degree of precautionary principles and Pitcher et al. (2009)
the among of contingency plans applied.
ln(GDP) Natural log of Gross domestic product per capita in World Bank (2008)
2000, in constant Dollars (PPP) WDI
COST Minimum great circle distance between port and center Authors' calculation
of a shing zone weighted by the amount a country FAO (2008)
is shing in that zone
GOV ICRG indicator of Quality of Government. Higher values PRS Group (2007)
indicate higher quality of government.
EU Dummy variable = 1 if country is member of the European Authors' calculation
Union and 0 otherwise.
COMPET Average degree of competition in FAO areas in which the Authors' calculation
country is shing.
BIO Biodiversity & Habitat indicator from Yale Environmental Emerson et al. (2010)
Performance Index. Measures the degree at which a country
achieves a target of protecting terrestrial biome, critical
habitats and manages marine protected areas.
EXPORT Export value of sh divided by GDP Authors' calculation
World Bank (2008) and
FAO (2008)
38